Colin Mc Hugo

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Colin Mc Hugo
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Exchange servers under siege from at least 10 APT groups

March 11, 2021

ESET Analysis has discovered LuckyMouse, Tick, Winnti Group, and Calypso, amongst others, are doubtless utilizing the current Microsoft Change vulnerabilities to compromise e mail servers all all over the world

On 2021-03-02, Microsoft launched out-of-band patches for Microsoft Change Server 2013, 2016 and 2019. These safety updates fastened a pre-authentication distant code execution (RCE) vulnerability chain (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) that permits an attacker to take over any reachable Change server, with out even figuring out any legitimate account credentials. We’ve already detected webshells on greater than 5,000 e mail servers as of the time of writing, and in line with public sources, a number of necessary organizations, such because the European Banking Authority, suffered from this assault.

These vulnerabilities have been first found by Orange Tsai, a well known vulnerability researcher, who reported them to Microsoft on 2021-01-05. Nonetheless, in line with a blogpost by Volexity, in-the-wild exploitation had already began on 2021-01-03. Thus, if these dates are right, the vulnerabilities have been both independently found by two completely different vulnerability analysis groups or that details about the vulnerabilities was by some means obtained by a malicious entity. Microsoft additionally revealed a blogpost concerning the early exercise of Hafnium.

On 2021-02-28, we seen that the vulnerabilities have been utilized by different menace actors, beginning with Tick and shortly joined by LuckyMouse, Calypso and the Winnti Group. This implies that a number of menace actors gained entry to the small print of the vulnerabilities earlier than the discharge of the patch, which implies we are able to discard the likelihood that they constructed an exploit by reverse engineering Microsoft updates.

Lastly, the day after the discharge of the patch, we began to see many extra menace actors (together with Tonto Workforce and Mikroceen) scanning and compromising Change servers en masse. Curiously, all of them are APT teams excited by espionage, aside from one outlier (DLTMiner), which is linked to a identified cryptomining marketing campaign. A abstract of the timeline is proven in Determine 1.

Determine 1. Timeline of necessary occasions

Exploitation statistics

For the previous few days, ESET researchers have been monitoring carefully the variety of webshell detections for these exploits. On the date of publication, we had noticed greater than 5,000 distinctive servers in over 115 international locations the place webshells have been flagged. These numbers make the most of ESET telemetry and are (clearly) not full. Determine 2 illustrates these detections earlier than and after the patch from Microsoft.

Determine 2. ESET detection of the webshells dropped by way of CVE-2021-26855 (hourly)

The heatmap in Determine 3 exhibits the geographical distribution of the webshell detections, in line with ESET telemetry. Resulting from mass exploitation, it’s doubtless that it represents the distribution of weak Change servers all over the world on which ESET safety merchandise are put in.

Determine 3. Proportion of webshell detections by nation (2021-02-28 to 2021-03-09)

From RCE to webshells to backdoors

We’ve recognized greater than 10 completely different menace actors that doubtless leveraged the current Microsoft Change RCE as a way to set up implants on victims’ e mail servers.

Our evaluation relies on e mail servers on which we discovered webshells in Offline Handle Ebook (OAB) configuration information, which is a selected approach used within the exploitation of the RCE vulnerability and has already been detailed in a Unit 42 blogpost. Sadly, we can’t low cost the likelihood that some menace actors might need hijacked the webshells dropped by different teams quite than immediately utilizing the exploit.

As soon as the vulnerability had been exploited and the webshell was in place, we noticed makes an attempt to put in extra malware by way of it. We additionally seen in some circumstances that a number of menace actors have been focusing on the identical group.


On 2021-02-28, Tick (often known as Bronze Butler) compromised the webserver of an organization based mostly in East Asia that gives IT providers. Which means that the group doubtless had entry to the exploit previous to the patch’s launch – on this case not less than two days earlier than.

The attacker used the next identify for the first-stage webshell:


We then noticed a Delphi backdoor, extremely just like previous Delphi implants utilized by the group. C&C addresses utilized by this backdoor are www.averyspace[.]internet and www.komdsecko[.]internet.

Tick is an APT group energetic since as early as 2008 and focusing on organizations based in Japan but in addition in South Korea, Russia and Singapore amongst others. Its important goal appears to be mental property and labeled data theft. It makes use of assorted proprietary malware reminiscent of Daserf, xxmm and Datper in addition to open supply RATs reminiscent of Lilith. Tick is among the many APT teams now gaining access to the ShadowPad backdoor, which was used throughout Operation ENTRADE documented by Trend Micro.


On 2021-03-01, LuckyMouse compromised the e-mail server of a governmental entity within the Center East, which implies this APT group doubtless had entry to the exploit not less than someday earlier than the patch launch, when it was nonetheless a zero day.

LuckyMouse operators began by dropping the Nbtscan tool in C:programdata, then put in a variant of the ReGeorg webshell and issued a GET request to http://34.90.207[.]23/ip utilizing curl. Lastly, they tried to put in their SysUpdate (aka Soldier) modular backdoor that makes use of the aforementioned IP deal with as its C&C server.

LuckyMouse, often known as APT27 and Emissary Panda, is a cyberespionage group identified to have breached a number of authorities networks in Central Asia and the Center East but in addition transnational organizations reminiscent of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2016. It makes use of numerous customized malware households reminiscent of HyperBro and SysUpdate.


On 2021-03-01, Calypso compromised the e-mail servers of governmental entities within the Center East and in South America, which implies the group doubtless had entry to the exploit as a zero day, like LuckyMouse and Tick. Within the following days, Calypso operators focused extra servers of governmental entities and personal corporations in Africa, Asia and Europe utilizing the exploit.

The attacker used the next names for the first-stage webshell:

  • C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientclient.aspx
  • C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientdiscover.aspx

As a part of these assaults, two completely different backdoors have been noticed: a variant of PlugX particular to the group (Win32/Korplug.ED) and a customized backdoor that we detect as Win32/Agent.UFX (generally known as Whitebird in a Dr.Web report). These instruments are loaded utilizing DLL search-order hijacking towards authentic executables (additionally dropped by the attackers):

  • netcfg.exe (SHA-1: 1349EF10BDD4FE58D6014C1043CBBC2E3BB19CC5) utilizing a malicious DLL named netcfg.dll (SHA-1: EB8D39CE08B32A07B7D847F6C29F4471CD8264F2)
  • CLNTCON.exe (SHA-1: B423BEA76F996BF2F69DCC9E75097635D7B7A7AA) utilizing a malicious DLL named SRVCON.OCX (SHA-1: 30DD3076EC9ABB13C15053234C436406B88FB2B9)
  • iPAQDetetion2.exe (SHA-1: C5D8FEC2C34572F5F2BD4F6B04B75E973FDFEA32) utilizing a malicious DLL named rapi.dll (SHA-1: 4F0EA31A363CFE0D2BBB4A0B4C5D558A87D8683E)

The backdoors have been configured to connect with the identical C&C servers: yolkish[.]com and rawfuns[.]com.

Lastly, we additionally noticed a variant of a instrument generally known as Mimikat_ssp that’s obtainable on GitHub.

Calypso (which can be tied to XPATH) is a cyberespionage group focusing on governmental establishments in Central Asia, the Center East, South America and Asia. Its important implant is a variant of the PlugX RAT.


Beginning 2021-03-01, ESET researchers noticed a brand new cluster of exercise we have now named Websiic, focusing on seven e mail servers belonging to non-public corporations (within the domains of IT, telecommunications and engineering) in Asia and a governmental physique in Jap Europe. As noticed within the circumstances above, the operators behind this cluster doubtless had entry to the exploit earlier than the patch’s launch.

This cluster was recognized by the presence of a loader as its first stage, typically named google.log or google.aspx, and an encrypted configuration file, typically named entry.log. The loader stops a selected service recognized within the config and creates a brand new entry underneath the Home windows service registry HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesParameters (the service’s filename is supplied by the config). It units two keys ServiceDll and ServiceMain. The primary one incorporates the trail to a DLL whereas the latter incorporates the export to name (INIT on this case). Lastly, it restarts the service that was stopped on the outset.

Whereas the loader was deployed on all victims from this cluster, the second stage (additionally a loader) was noticed on the pc of solely one of many victims and was situated in C:Program FilesCommon Filesmicrosoft sharedWMIiiswmi.dll. The DLL has an export named INIT that incorporates the primary logic and makes use of the identical XOR encryption loop in addition to the identical approach to dynamically resolve the Home windows API names as seen within the first stage. It masses the next DLL %COMMONPROGRAMFILESpercentSystemwebsvc.dll with an argument extracted from the registry key HKLMSOFTWAREClassesInterface{6FD0637B-85C6-D3A9-CCE9-65A3F73ADED9}. Sadly, the dearth of indicators matching beforehand identified menace actors prevents us from drawing any conclusions or an affordable speculation as to the group behind these assaults.

Seven victims have been flagged by the presence of the primary loader and at certainly one of them, the second loader was recognized. We’ve not at present tied any identified menace actor to Websiic. A current article from GTSC additionally briefly describes the identical cluster.

Winnti Group

Beginning 2021-03-02, a number of hours earlier than Microsoft launched the patch, the Winnti Group (often known as BARIUM or APT41) compromised the e-mail servers of an oil firm and a development tools firm each based mostly in East Asia. This means that this APT group additionally had entry to the exploit previous to the patch launch.

The attackers began by dropping webshells on the following places, relying on the sufferer:

  • C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientcaches.aspx
  • C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientshell.aspx

At one of many compromised victims we noticed a PlugX RAT pattern (often known as Korplug) with C&C area mm.portomnail[.]com and Be aware that mm.portomnail[.]com was previously used by the Winnti Group with ShadowPad and the Winnti malware. On the identical machine, throughout the identical timeframe, we additionally noticed some malware, not but totally analyzed, utilizing 139.162.123[.]108 as its C&C deal with however on the time of writing we don’t know whether or not that is associated to the Change compromise or not.

On the second sufferer, we noticed a loader that’s extremely just like earlier Winnti v4 malware loaders reminiscent of that talked about in our white paper on the arsenal of the Winnti Group. Like that Winnti v4 loader, this loader is used to decrypt an encrypted payload from disk and execute it utilizing the next command:


the place is the decryption key used to decrypt the payload saved in . As soon as executed, this loader drops a malicious DLL on the following location:


This malicious DLL shares a number of similarities with a earlier Winnti implant documented by Trend Micro in addition to the Spyder backdoor not too long ago documented by DrWeb and that we have now noticed being utilized by the Winnti Group previously. The C&C deal with utilized by this implant is 161.129.64[.]124:443.

Moreover, we noticed numerous Mimikatz and password dumping instruments.

The Winnti Group, energetic since not less than 2012, is answerable for high-profile supply-chain assaults towards the online game and software program industries, resulting in the distribution of trojanized software program (reminiscent of CCleaner, ASUS LiveUpdate and multiple video games) that’s then used to compromise extra victims. It is usually identified for having compromised numerous targets in a number of completely different verticals reminiscent of healthcare and schooling.

Tonto Workforce

On 2021-03-03, Tonto Workforce (often known as CactusPete) compromised the e-mail servers of a procurement firm and of a consulting firm specialised in software program improvement and cybersecurity, each based mostly in Jap Europe.

In that case, the attacker used C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientdukybySSSS.aspx for the first-stage webshell.

The attacker then used PowerShell to obtain their payloads from 77.83.159[.]15. These payloads encompass a authentic and signed Microsoft executable used as a DLL search-order hijacking host and a malicious DLL loaded by that executable. The malicious DLL is a ShadowPad loader. The C&C deal with being utilized by ShadowPad right here is lab.symantecsafe[.]org and the communication protocol is HTTPS.

Along with ShadowPad, the attacker additionally made use of a variant of the Bisonal RAT extremely just like a Bisonal variant that was beforehand used throughout Operation Bitter Biscuit attributed to Tonto Team.

On one of many compromised machines, the attacker used an LSAS dumper that was additionally beforehand utilized by Tonto Workforce.

Tonto Workforce is an APT group energetic since not less than 2009 and focusing on governments and establishments principally based mostly in Russia, Japan and Mongolia. For greater than ten years, Tonto Workforce has been utilizing the Bisonal RAT. Tonto Workforce is without doubt one of the APT teams that now has entry to the ShadowPad backdoor.

Unattributed ShadowPad exercise

Beginning 2021-03-03, we noticed the compromise of e mail servers at a software program improvement firm based mostly in East Asia and an actual property firm based mostly within the Center East the place ShadowPad was dropped by the attacker and that we weren’t in a position to conclusively attribute to any identified teams on the time of writing.

The attackers used C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientdiscover.aspx and C:Program FilesMicrosoftExchange ServerV15FrontEndHttpProxyowaauthRedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx as first-stage webshells and dropped ShadowPad on the following places:

  • C:WindowsHelpmui109mscoree.dll
  • C:mscoree.dll

One of many ShadowPad samples makes use of comfortable.mssysinfo[.]xyz as its C&C deal with utilizing the HTTPS protocol whereas the second pattern makes use of ns.rtechs[.]org utilizing the DNS protocol, which is much less widespread.

The ShadowPad backdoor is a modular backdoor that was unique to the Winnti Group till the tip of 2019. To one of the best of our information, ShadowPad is now utilized by not less than 5 extra teams: Tick, Tonto Workforce, KeyBoy, IceFog and TA428.

The “Opera” Cobalt Strike

On 2021-03-03 at 04:23 AM UTC, just some hours after the patch was launched, we seen that one other set of malicious actions had began. At this level we don’t know if these menace actors had entry to the exploit beforehand or reverse engineered the patch. This corresponds to indicators that have been revealed on Twitter and by FireEye, however we haven’t been in a position to hyperlink this set to any group we’re already monitoring.

From 2021-03-03 to 2021-03-05, ESET telemetry exhibits this exercise focusing on round 650 servers, principally within the US, Germany, the UK and different European international locations. Curiously, this menace actor was constant within the naming and placement of their first-stage webshell, at all times utilizing FrontEndHttpProxyowaauthRedirSuiteServerProxy.aspx.

Then on a number of chosen machines, they executed a PowerShell script, proven in Determine 4, to obtain extra parts from 86.105.18[.]116. The ultimate payload is Cobalt Strike, which makes use of the identical IP deal with for its C&C server. Cobalt Strike is loaded by way of DLL search-order hijacking towards a authentic Opera executable named opera_browser.exe (SHA-1: AB5AAA34200A3DD2276A20102AB9D7596FDB9A83) utilizing a DLL named opera_browser.dll (SHA-1: 02886F9DAA13F7D9855855048C54F1D6B1231B0A) that decrypts and masses a shellcode from opera_browser.png (SHA-1: 2886F9DAA13F7D9855855048C54F1D6B1231B0A).  We seen that 89.34.111[.]11 was additionally used to distribute malicious information.

Determine 4. PowerShell script used to obtain Cobalt Strike

IIS backdoors

Beginning 2021-03-03, we noticed that on 4 e mail servers situated in Asia and South America, webshells have been used to put in so-called IIS backdoors.

We recognized two completely different malware households:

  • A modified model of IIS-Raid. It comes from a PoC launched on GitHub and documented final yr by MDSec.
  • A variant of Owlproxy, which was documented final yr by Cycraft as a part of a number of incidents towards Taiwanese governmental companies.


On 2021-03-04, the Mikroceen APT group compromised the Change server of a utility firm in Central Asia, which is the area it primarily targets.

Mikroceen operators began by dropping webshells in C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientaspnet_regiis.aspx, FrontEndHttpProxyowaauthaspnet_error.aspx and C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientlog_error_9e23efc3.aspx. Then, they downloaded a payload we couldn’t recuperate from http://46.30.188[.]60/webengine4.dll. We weren’t in a position to tie these first steps to Mikroceen with excessive confidence, however these indicators appeared solely on the precise server the place we noticed the Mikroceen backdoors a number of hours after.

A couple of hours later, a Mikroceen RAT was dropped in C:UsersPublicDownloadsservice.exe. Its C&C server is 172.105.18[.]72. Then, this RAT dropped extra instruments reminiscent of Mimikatz (in C:userspublicalg.exe), Mimikat_ssp (in C:userspublicDump.exe) and a customized proxy (in c:UsersPubliccalcx.exe). The latter was executed with the next command line (exposing one other attacker-controlled IP deal with):

calcx.exe  300 194.68.44[.]19 c:userspublic1.log :3128

The Mikroceen APT group (aka Vicious Panda) is a menace actor working since not less than 2017. It primarily targets governmental establishments and telcos in Central Asia, Russia and Mongolia. It makes use of a customized backdoor we’ve named Mikroceen RAT.


Beginning 2021-03-05 at 02:53 AM UTC, we detected the deployment of PowerShell downloaders on a number of e mail servers that have been beforehand focused utilizing these Change vulnerabilities.

The primary PowerShell script downloads the subsequent stage on the following deal with http://p.estonine[.]com/p?e. Earlier articles from 2019 present similarities between this cluster and a cryptominer marketing campaign. Extra particulars concerning the evaluation will be present in Tencent and Carbon Black blogposts. A more moderen Twitter submit describes the assorted compromise steps.

We have been unable to search out any correlation when it comes to webshells deployed on these servers. It’s attainable that this group is hijacking webshells beforehand put in by different menace teams.


Our ongoing analysis exhibits that not solely Hafnium has been utilizing the current RCE vulnerability in Change, however that a number of APTs have entry to the exploit, and a few even did so previous to the patch launch. It’s nonetheless unclear how the distribution of the exploit occurred, however it’s inevitable that increasingly more menace actors, together with ransomware operators, may have entry to it eventually.

It’s now clearly past prime time to patch all Change servers as quickly as attainable (see Microsoft guidance and apply particular care in following the steps within the “About set up of those updates” part). Even these indirectly uncovered to the web ought to be patched as a result of an attacker with low, or unprivileged, entry to your LAN can trivially exploit these vulnerabilities to boost their privileges whereas compromising an inside (and possibly extra delicate) Change server, after which transfer laterally from it.

In case of compromise, one ought to take away webshells, change credentials and examine for any extra malicious exercise.

Lastly, it is a superb reminder that advanced functions reminiscent of Microsoft Change or SharePoint shouldn’t be open to the web since, in case of mass exploitation, it is vitally onerous, if not unimaginable, to patch in time.

For any inquiries, or to make pattern submissions associated to the topic, contact us at: [email protected]

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

A plaintext listing of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and a MISP occasion will be present in our GitHub repository.


ESET detects the webshells utilized in these assaults as JS/Exploit.CVE-2021-26855.Webshell.A and JS/Exploit.CVE-2021-26855.Webshell.B.

The ASPX webshells are sometimes positioned in these folders, utilizing a big number of filenames:

  • C:inetpubwwwrootaspnet_clientsystem_web
  • FrontEndHttpProxyowaauthCurrentthemesresources
  • FrontEndHttpProxyowaauth

Malware information

SHA-1 ESET detection identify Particulars
30DD3076EC9ABB13C15053234C436406B88FB2B9 Win32/Korplug.RT Calypso loader for Win32/Korplug.ED
EB8D39CE08B32A07B7D847F6C29F4471CD8264F2 Win32/Korplug.RU Calypso loader for Win32/Korplug.ED
4F0EA31A363CFE0D2BBB4A0B4C5D558A87D8683E Win32/Agent.ACUS Calypso loader for Win32/Agent.UFX
2075D8E39B7D389F92FD97D97C41939F64822361 Win64/HackTool.Mimikat.A Mimikat_ssp utilized by Calypso
02886F9DAA13F7D9855855048C54F1D6B1231B0A Win32/Agent.ACUQ Opera Cobalt Strike loader
123CF9013FA73C4E1F8F68905630C8B5B481FCE7 Win64/Mikroceen.AN Mikroceen RAT
B873C80562A0D4C3D0F8507B7B8EC82C4DF9FB07 Win64/HackTool.Mimikat.A Mimikat_ssp utilized by Mikroceen
59C507BCBEFCA2E894471EFBCD40B5AAD5BC4AC8 Win32/HackTool.Proxy.A Proxy utilized by Mikroceen
3D5D32A62F770608B6567EC5D18424C24C3F5798 Win64/Kryptik.CHN ShadowPad backdoor utilized by Tonto Workforce
AF421B1F5A08499E130D24F448F6D79F7C76AF2B Win64/Riskware.LsassDumper.J LSASS dumper utilized by Tonto Workforce
1DE8CBBF399CBC668B6DD6927CFEE06A7281CDA4 Win32/Agent.ACGZ PlugX injector utilized by the Winnti Group
B8D7B850DC185160A24A3EE43606A9EF41D60E80 Win64/Winnti.DA Winnti loader
33C7C049967F21DA0F1431A2D134F4F1DE9EC27E Win64/HackTool.Mimikat.A Mimikatz utilized by the Winnti Group
A0B86104E2D00B3E52BDA5808CCEED9842CE2CEA Win64/HackTool.Mimikat.A Mimikatz utilized by the Winnti Group
281FA52B967B08DBC1B51BAFBFBF7A258FF12E54 Win32/PSWTool.QuarksPwDump.E Password dumper utilized by the Winnti Group
46F44B1760FF1DBAB6AAD44DEB1D68BEE0E714EA Win64/Shadowpad.E Unattributed ShadowPad
195FC90AEE3917C94730888986E34A195C12EA78 Win64/Shadowpad.E Unattributed ShadowPad
29D8DEDCF19A8691B4A3839B805730DDA9D0B87C PowerShell/TrojanDownloader.Agent.CEK DLTMiner
20546C5A38191D1080B4EE8ADF1E54876BEDFB9E PowerShell/TrojanDownloader.Agent.CEK DLTMiner
84F4AEAB426CE01334FD2DA3A11D981F6D9DCABB Win64/Agent.AKS Websiic
9AFA2AFB838CAF2748D09D013D8004809D48D3E4 Win64/Agent.AKS Websiic
3ED18FBE06D6EF2C8332DB70A3221A00F7251D55 Win64/Agent.AKT Websiic
AA9BA493CB9E9FA6F9599C513EDBCBEE84ECECD6 Win64/Agent.IG IIS Backoor

C&C servers

IP deal with / area Particulars
34.90.207[.]23 LuckyMouse SysUpdate C&C server
yolkish[.]com Calypso C&C server
rawfuns[.]com Calypso C&C server
86.105.18[.]116 “Opera Cobalt Strike” C&C & distribution server
89.34.111[.]11 “Opera Cobalt Strike” distribution server
172.105.18[.]72 Mikroceen RAT C&C server
194.68.44[.]19 Mikroceen proxy C&C server
www.averyspace[.]internet Tick Delphi backdoor C&C server
www.komdsecko[.]internet Tick Delphi backdoor C&C server
77.83.159[.]15 Tonto Workforce distribution server
lab.symantecsafe[.]org Tonto Workforce ShadowPad C&C server
mm.portomnail[.]com Winnti Group PlugX C&C server
again.rooter[.]tk Winnti Group PlugX C&C server
161.129.64[.]124 Winnti malware C&C server
ns.rtechs[.]org Unclassified ShadowPad C&C server
comfortable.mssysinfo[.]xyz Unclassified ShadowPad C&C server
p.estonine[.]com DLTMiner C&C server

MITRE ATT&CK strategies

Be aware 1: This desk was constructed utilizing version 8 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Be aware 2: This desk consists of strategies masking the exploitation of the vulnerability and the webshell’s deployment.

Tactic ID Identify Description
Reconnaissance T1595 Energetic Scanning Attackers are scanning the web as a way to discover weak Microsoft Change servers.
Useful resource Improvement T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits Attackers developed or acquired exploits for CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065.
Preliminary Entry T1190 Exploit Public-Going through Utility Attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Change 2013, 2016 and 2019 (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) to realize a foothold on the e-mail servers.
Execution T1203 Exploitation for Shopper Execution Attackers exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft Change 2013, 2016 and 2019 (CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065) to drop an ASPX webshell on the compromised e mail servers.
Persistence T1505.003 Server Software program Element: Internet Shell Attackers put in China Chopper ASPX webshells in IIS or Change folders reachable from the web.

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