ESET Analysis uncovers a complicated scheme that distributes trojanized Android and iOS apps posing as well-liked cryptocurrency wallets

On the time of scripting this blogpost, the worth of bitcoin (US$38,114.80) has decreased about 44 p.c from its all-time excessive about 4 months in the past. For cryptocurrency traders, this is likely to be a time both to panic and withdraw their funds, or for newcomers to leap at this opportunity and purchase cryptocurrency for a lower cost. For those who belong to one in every of these teams, it is best to decide rigorously which cell app to make use of for managing your funds.

Beginning in Might 2021, our analysis uncovered dozens of trojanized cryptocurrency pockets apps. We discovered trojanized Android and iOS apps distributed by means of web sites mimicking reputable providers . These malicious apps had been capable of steal victims’ secret seed phrases by impersonating Coinbase, imToken, MetaMask, Belief Pockets, Bitpie, TokenPocket, or OneKey.

It is a refined assault vector for the reason that malware’s writer carried out an in-depth evaluation of the reputable functions misused on this scheme, enabling the insertion of their very own malicious code into locations the place it could be laborious to detect whereas additionally ensuring that such crafted apps had the identical performance because the originals. At this level, we imagine that that is the work of 1 particular person attacker or, extra possible, one legal group.

The principle aim of those malicious apps is to steal customers’ funds and till now we now have seen this scheme primarily focusing on Chinese language customers. As cryptocurrencies are gaining recognition, we anticipate these strategies to unfold into different markets. That is additional supported by the general public sharing, in November 2021, of the supply code of the front-end and back-end distribution web site, together with the recompiled APK and IPA information. We discovered this code on a minimum of 5 web sites, the place it was shared at no cost, and thus anticipate to see extra copycat attackers. From the posts we discovered, it’s tough to find out whether or not it was shared deliberately or if it leaked.

These malicious apps additionally characterize one other risk to victims, as a few of them ship secret sufferer seed phrases to the attackers’ server utilizing an unsecured HTTP connection. Which means victims’ funds might be stolen not solely by the operator of this scheme, but in addition by a unique attacker eavesdropping on the identical community. Moreover this cryptocurrency pockets scheme, we additionally found 13 malicious apps impersonating the Jaxx Liberty pockets. These apps had been accessible on the Google Play retailer, which is proactively protected by the App Protection Alliance, of which ESET is among the scanning companions, previous to apps being listed.


ESET Analysis recognized over 40 copycat web sites of well-liked cryptocurrency wallets. These web sites goal solely cell customers and provide them the obtain of malicious pockets apps.

We had been capable of hint the distribution vector of those trojanized cryptocurrency wallets again to Might 2021 primarily based on the area registration that was supplied for these malicious apps within the wild, in addition to the creation of a number of Telegram teams that began to seek for affiliate companions.

On Telegram, a free and well-liked multiplatform messaging app with enhanced privateness and encryption options, we discovered dozens of such teams selling malicious copies of cryptocurrency cell wallets. We assume these teams had been created by the risk actor behind this scheme in search of additional distribution companions, suggesting choices reminiscent of telemarketing, social media, commercial, SMS, third-party channels, pretend web sites and many others. All these teams had been speaking in Chinese language. Primarily based on the data acquired from these teams, an individual distributing this malware is obtainable a 50 p.c fee on the stolen contents of the pockets.

Determine 1. One of many first Telegram teams trying to find distribution companions

Determine 2. Telegram teams trying to find distribution companions

Admins of those Telegram teams posted step-by-step video demonstrations of how these pretend wallets work and tips on how to entry them as soon as victims enter their seed phrases, that are a set of phrases that can be utilized to entry one’s cryptocurrency pockets. For example how profitable this malicious scheme is, admins additionally included screenshots from admin panels and pictures of a number of cryptocurrency wallets that they declare belong to them. Nonetheless, it’s not attainable to confirm whether or not the funds proven in these video demonstrations originate from such unlawful actions or are simply bait from recruiters.

Determine 3. Admin panel with seed phrases of a possible sufferer

Determine 4. Pictures of pockets balances allegedly belonging to the attackers

Shortly after, beginning in October 2021, we discovered that these Telegram teams had been shared and promoted in a minimum of 56 Fb teams, with the identical aim – to seek for extra distribution companions.


Determine 5. Promotion of malicious wallets in Fb teams

In November 2021, we noticed the distribution of malicious wallets, utilizing two reputable web sites, focusing on customers in China (yanggan[.]internet, 80rd[.]com). On these web sites, within the class “Funding and monetary administration”, we found as much as six articles selling cell cryptocurrency wallets utilizing copycat web sites, main customers to obtain malicious cell functions claiming to be reputable and dependable. These posts abuse the names of reputable cryptocurrency wallets reminiscent of imToken, Bitpie, MetaMask, TokenPocket, OneKey, and Belief Pockets.

All posts contained a view counter with publicly accessible statistics. On the time of our analysis, all of those posts collectively had over 1840 views; nevertheless, it doesn’t imply these articles had been visited that many occasions.

Determine 6. Submit selling pretend MetaMask service

Determine 7. Submit selling pretend Belief Pockets service

On December 10th, 2021, the risk actor posted an article on a reputable Chinese language web site within the Blockchain Information class, informing about Beijing’s newest cryptocurrency ban. This ban on cryptocurrency exchanges suspended new registrations of customers in mainland China. The writer of this put up additionally put collectively an inventory of cryptocurrency wallets (not exchanges) to avoid the present ban. The checklist recommends utilizing 5 wallets – imToken, Bitpie, MetaMask, TokenPocket, and OneKey. The issue is that the recommended web sites usually are not the official websites for the wallets, however quite web sites mimicking the reputable providers.

Determine 8. Article posted at intelsofa[.]com providing malicious alternate options

On prime of that, the principle web page of this web site additionally comprises an commercial for the aforementioned pretend wallets.

Determine 9. Predominant web page comprises commercial for pretend wallets

Moreover these distribution vectors, we found dozens of different counterfeit pockets web sites which can be focusing on cell customers solely. Visiting one of many web sites would possibly lead a possible sufferer to obtain a trojanized pockets app for Android or the iOS platform. The websites themselves weren’t phishing for restoration seeds or cryptocurrency alternate credentials they usually didn’t goal desktop customers or their browsers with the choice to obtain a malicious extension.

Determine 10 exhibits the timeline of those occasions.

Determine 10. Timeline of the scheme

Variations in conduct on iOS and Android

The malicious app behaves in a different way relying on the working system it was put in on.

On Android, it seems to focus on new cryptocurrency customers who don’t but have a reputable pockets utility put in on their units. Trojanized wallets have the identical bundle identify as reputable functions; nevertheless, they’re signed utilizing a unique certificates. Which means if the official pockets is already put in on an Android smartphone, the malicious app can’t overwrite it as a result of the important thing used to signal the counterfeit app is totally different from the reputable utility. That’s the usual safety mannequin of Android apps, the place non-genuine variations of an app can’t exchange the unique.

Nonetheless, on iOS, the sufferer can have each variations put in – the reputable one from the App Retailer and the malicious one from a web site – as a result of they don’t share the identical bundle ID.

Determine 11. Unsuccessful try to put in a malicious pockets over a reputable one on Android

Determine 12. Trojanized pockets was efficiently put in on iPhone

Compromise movement

For Android units, websites supplied the choice to instantly obtain the malicious app from their servers even when the consumer clicked on the button “Get it on Google Play”. As soon as downloaded, the app must be manually put in by the consumer.

Determine 13. Pretend web sites provide customers to obtain the malicious app

Relating to iOS, these malicious apps usually are not accessible on the App Retailer; they should be downloaded and put in utilizing configuration profiles, which add an arbitrary trusted code-signing certificates. Utilizing these profiles, it’s attainable to obtain functions that aren’t verified by Apple and from sources outdoors the App Retailer.  Apple launched configuration profiles in iOS 4 and meant them for use in company and academic settings to permit community or system directors to put in sitewide, customized apps with out having to add them to, and have them verified by means of, the same old App Retailer procedures. Unsurprisingly, social engineering victims into putting in configuration profiles to allow the following set up of malware is now being utilized by cybercriminals. Purposes enabled by way of configuration profiles should be put in manually.

Determine 14. Malicious pockets put in by way of configuration profile


For each platforms, downloaded apps behave like absolutely working wallets – victims can’t see any distinction. That is attainable as a result of the attackers took the reputable pockets apps and repackaged them with extra malicious code.

Repackaging of those reputable pockets apps wanted to be performed manually, with out using any automated instruments. Due to that, it required the attackers to carry out an in-depth evaluation of the pockets apps for each platforms first, after which discover the precise locations within the code the place the seed phrase is both generated or imported by the consumer. In these locations, the attackers inserted malicious code that’s accountable for acquiring the seed phrase and its extraction to the attackers’ server.

For many who usually are not conscious of the seed or restoration phrase, when a cryptocurrency pockets is created, this phrase is generated as an inventory of phrases that enable the pockets’s proprietor to entry the pockets’s funds.

If the attackers have a seed phrase, they will manipulate the content material of the pockets as if it had been their very own.

A number of the malicious apps ship secret sufferer seed phrases to the attackers’ server utilizing the unsecured HTTP protocol, with none extra encryption in place. Due to that, different dangerous actors on the identical community might listen in on the community communication and steal victims’ seed or restoration phrases to entry their funds. This assault situation is called an adversary-in-the-middle assault.

Now we have seen numerous sorts of malicious code carried out within the trojanized pockets functions we’ve analyzed.

Patched binary

Malicious code was patched right into a binary file (lessons.dex) of a malicious Android pockets. A brand new class was inserted, together with the calls to its strategies that had been present in particular locations of the pockets code the place it processes the seed phrase. This class was accountable for sending the seed phrase to the attackers’ server. Server names had been at all times hardcoded, so the malicious app couldn’t replace them within the occasion that the servers had been taken down.

Determine 15. Comparability of authentic code (left) with malicious code (proper)

Determine 16. Malicious code accountable for exfiltrating seed phrase

Determine 17. Seed phrase being efficiently extracted to the attackers’ server

In an iOS app, the risk actor injected a malicious dynamic library (dylib) right into a reputable IPA file. This may be performed both manually or by binding it robotically utilizing numerous patching instruments. Such a library is then a part of the app and executed throughout runtime. Within the display screen beneath you’ll be able to see the elements of dynamic libraries present in each reputable and patched IPA information.

Determine 18. Dynamic libraries in a reputable app (left) and a maliciously patched model of the identical app (proper)

The picture above exhibits that the dynamic library libDevBitpieProDylib.dylib comprises malicious code accountable for extracting the sufferer’s seed phrase.

We discovered the code from the dynamic library that extracts the seed phrase, as seen beneath.

Determine 19. Malicious code discovered within the dynamic library

Determine 20. Seed phrase being efficiently exfiltrated from an iPhone to the attackers’ server

Patched JavaScript

Malicious code isn’t at all times current in a compiled kind. A number of the wallets are mainly net functions and their cell apps carry all net elements, reminiscent of HTML, photos and scripts, in property throughout the app. In these instances, the attackers can insert malicious code in JavaScript as a substitute. This system doesn’t require altering the executable file.

Within the picture beneath we evaluate the unique and the malicious model of a script discovered within the file. Primarily based on that, we will see the attackers modified the script in a number of particular locations by inserting their very own routines accountable for stealing seed phrases. Such a patched script was present in each the Android and iOS variations of those apps.

Determine 21. Comparability of authentic (left) and malicious (proper) file utilizing WinMerge

The movies beneath show the compromise and secret seed phrase exfiltration from the sufferer’s machine.

Determine 22. The compromise and secret seed phrase exfiltration from the sufferer’s machine (Android)


Determine 23. The compromise and secret seed phrase exfiltration from the sufferer’s machine (iOS)

Leaked supply code

ESET Analysis found that the supply code of the front-end and back-end, along with recompiled and patched cell apps included in these malicious pockets schemes, was publicly shared on a minimum of 5 Chinese language web sites and in a number of Telegram teams in November 2021.

Determine 24. Supply code accessible for obtain

Proper now, it seems that the risk actors behind this scheme are more than likely situated in China. Nonetheless, for the reason that code is already shared publicly at no cost, it’d entice different attackers – even outdoors of China – and goal a wider spectrum of cryptocurrency wallets utilizing an improved scheme.

Pretend pockets apps found in Google Play retailer

Primarily based on our request as a Google App Defense Alliance partner, in January 2022, Google eliminated 13 malicious functions discovered on the Google Play retailer that impersonated the reputable Jaxx Liberty Wallet app; they had been put in greater than 1,100 occasions. One of many apps on this checklist used a pretend web site mimicking Jaxx Liberty as a distribution vector. Because the risk actor behind this malicious app managed to position it within the official Google Play retailer, the pretend web site redirected the consumer to obtain its cell model from the Google Play retailer and didn’t have to make use of a third-party app retailer as an middleman. This ought to be a profitable trick to persuade a possible sufferer that the app is reputable because it’s accessible for obtain from the official app retailer.

Determine 25. Pretend web site redirects the consumer to put in the pretend app from Google Play

A few of these apps make the most of homoglyphs, a way extra generally utilized in phishing assaults: they exchange characters of their names with look-alikes from the Unicode character set. That is more than likely to bypass app identify filters for well-liked apps created by reliable builders.

Compared to the trojanized pockets apps described above, these apps had been with none reputable performance – their aim was merely to tease out the consumer’s restoration seed phrase and ship it both to the attackers’ server or to a secret Telegram chat group.

Determine 26. Pretend Jaxx Liberty app requests consumer’s seed phrase

Prevention and uninstallation

ESET researchers often advise customers to obtain and set up apps solely from official sources, such because the Google Play retailer or Apple’s App Retailer. A dependable cell safety resolution ought to be capable to detect this risk on an Android machine – as an illustration, ESET merchandise detect this risk as Android/FakeWallet. Within the Google Play retailer case, ESET takes its dedication to defending the cell ecosystem additional, partnering with different safety distributors and Google within the App Protection Alliance to help within the vetting of apps submitted for itemizing on Google Play.

On an iOS machine, the character of the working system – when not jailbroken – permits an app to speak with different apps solely in very restricted methods. That’s the reason for iOS, no safety options are supplied, as they might solely be capable to scan themselves. Subsequently, downloading apps solely from the official App Retailer, being particularly cautious about accepting configuration profiles, and avoiding a jailbreak on this platform are essentially the most advisable prevention suggestions.

If any of those apps are already put in in your machine, the elimination course of differs primarily based on the cell platform. On Android, whatever the supply from which you downloaded the malicious app – official or unofficial – if there are doubts in regards to the legitimacy of the supply, we advise uninstalling the app. Not one of the malware described on this blogpost leaves any backdoors or leftovers on the machine after elimination.

On iOS, after uninstalling the malicious app, additionally it is essential to take away its configuration profile by going to Settings → Common → VPN & Machine Administration. Beneath the CONFIGURATION PROFILE it is possible for you to to discover a identify of the profile that must be eliminated.

Determine 27. Removing of unknown and malicious profile

For those who both already created a brand new, or restored an outdated, pockets utilizing such a malicious utility, we advise instantly making a brand-new pockets with a trusted machine and utility and transferring all funds to it. That is mandatory because the attackers have already obtained the seed phrase and would possibly switch accessible funds at any time. Contemplating that the attackers know the historical past of all of the sufferer’s transactions, the attackers may not steal the funds instantly and would possibly quite anticipate a greater alternative after extra cash are deposited.


ESET Analysis was capable of uncover and backtrack a complicated malicious cryptocurrency scheme that targets cell units utilizing Android or iOS working methods. It has been distributed by means of pretend web sites, mimicking reputable pockets providers reminiscent of Metamask, Coinbase, Belief Pockets, TokenPocket, Bitpie, imToken, and OneKey. These pretend web sites are promoted with advertisements positioned on reputable websites utilizing deceptive articles, for instance in “Funding and monetary administration” sections.

Sooner or later, we would anticipate an enlargement of this risk, since risk actors are recruiting intermediaries by means of Telegram teams and Fb to additional distribute this malicious scheme, providing them a proportion of the cryptocurrency stolen from the wallets.

Furthermore, it appears that evidently the supply code of this risk has been leaked and shared on a number of Chinese language web sites, which could entice numerous risk actors and unfold this risk even additional.

The aim of those pretend websites is to make customers obtain and set up malicious cell pockets functions. These pockets apps are trojanized copies of reputable ones – that’s the reason they work as actual wallets on a sufferer’s machine – nevertheless, they’re patched with a number of traces of malicious code that’s accountable for stealing the sufferer’s secret seed phrase.

This refined assault required the attackers to carry out an in-depth evaluation of every pockets utility first, to determine the precise locations within the authentic code to inject their malicious code, after which to advertise them and make them accessible for obtain by means of pretend web sites.

We wish to enchantment to the cryptocurrency group, primarily newcomers, to remain vigilant and use solely official cell wallets and alternate apps, downloaded from official app shops which can be explicitly linked to the official web sites of such providers, and to remind iOS machine customers of the risks of accepting configuration profiles from something however essentially the most reliable of sources.

For any inquiries about our analysis revealed on WeLiveSecurity, please contact us at [email protected]

ESET Analysis now additionally affords personal APT intelligence experiences and knowledge feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Threat Intelligence web page.



First seen MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 Bundle identify Description C&C ESET detection identify
2021‑12‑19 1AA2F6795BF8723958313BAD7A2657B4 B719403DC3743D91380682EAC290C3C67A738192 5DA813FEC32E937E5F2AE82C57842FDED71F0671E1D8E6FD50FF8521D183F809 com.pockets.crypto.trustapp Trojanized model of Belief Pockets Android utility. two.shayu[.]la Android/FakeWallet.B
2022‑01‑19 E7CEBF27E8D4F546DA9491DA78C5D4B4 BC47D84B8E47D6EAF501F2F0642A7C4E26EC88B6 A4D875C13B46BC744D18BB6668F17EA67BFF85B26CF0D46100736BD62DB649AE com.pockets.crypto.trustapp Trojanized model of Belief Pockets Android utility. 725378[.]com Android/FakeWallet.D
2022‑02‑05 22689A6DA0FC86AD75BF62F3B172478D CDB96862A68A1C01EA5364CB03760AE59C2B0A74 127E4DA1614E42B541338C0FAACD7C656655C9C0228F7D00EC9E13507FA0F9E9 com.bitpie Trojanized model of Bitpie Android utility. bp.tkdt[.]cc Android/FakeWallet.AB
2022‑02‑07 4729D57DF40585428ADCE26A478C1C3A E9B7D8F93B4C04B5DC3D1216482035C242F98F24 0B60C44749B43147D40547B438B8CCB50717B319EF20D938AB59F0079D1BA57C cce4492155695349d80ad508d33e33ae93772fba39e50c520f3f6deaf43c8e2780b40762eosIM0.ipa Trojanized model of Bitpie iOS utility. jdzpfw[.]com iOS/FakeWallet.A
2022‑02‑04 6D0C9DDD18538494EB9CA7B4BC78BDB0 3772A8ACD9EB01D2DC8124C9CDA4E8F4219AE9F3 9017EF4A85AC85373D0F718F05F4A5C441F17AE1FD9A7BFD18521E560E6AB39E com.bixin.pockets.mainnet Trojanized model of OneKey Android utility. okay.tkdt[.]cc Android/FakeWallet.AA
2022-01-20 140DB26EB6631B240B3443FDB49D4878 869155A5CB6D773243B16CCAF30CEC5C697AC939 8ADCD1C8313C421D36EB6C4DF948D9C40578A145764E545F5AC536DC95ED2069 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. 725378[.]com Android/FakeWallet.F
2022-01-20 A2AFDED28CB68CADF30386FC15A26AFA 5B0363F1CB0DB00B7449ABE0B1E5E455A6A69070 FD88D8E01DB36E5BE354456F1FB9560CE9A3328EEFBF77D5560F3BDDA1856C80 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. xdhbj[.]com Android/FakeWallet.E
2022-01-21 383DB92495705C0B25E56785CF17AAC9 CF742505000CCE89AB6AFCAEC7AB407F7A9DFB98 0ED22309BF79221B5C099285C4CDE8BAB43BA088890A14707CC68BC7A8BA15AE io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. api.metamasks[.]me Android/FakeWallet.H
2022-01-21 B366FCF5CA01A9C51806A7E688F1FFBE 399C85CCC752B1D8285B9F949AC1F4483921DE64 49937230ABB29118BDA0F24EBEFD9F887857814C9B4DC064AED52A9A3C278D53 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. replace.xzxqsf[.]com Android/FakeWallet.I
2022-01-19 B6E8F936D72755A812F7412E76F6968E E525248D78D931AF92E2F5376F1979A029FA4157 0056027FBC4643D24282B35F53E03AC1E4C090AA22F2F88B1D8CBD590C51F399 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. metamask.tptokenm[.]dwell Android/FakeWallet.G
2022‑02‑01 54053B4CCACAA36C570A4ED500A8C4A2 99144787792303F747F7EF14B80860878A204497 553209AEEA2515F4A7D76CE0111DD240AEAD97FAC149ACC3D161C36B89B729D8 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. imtokenss.token-app[.]cc Android/FakeWallet.P
2022‑02‑04 15BDC469C943CF563F857DE4DCA7FCC5 664F1E208DA29E50DF795144CB3F80C9582B33E3 CD896A7816768A770305F3C2C07BCC81ABDF1F18B9F3C2B48B4494704A3B61B7 io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. jdzpfw[.]com Android/FakeWallet.W
2021-12-11 A202D183B45D3AB10221BCB40A3D3EC2 15D11E0AB0A416DB96C0713764D092CB245B8D17 E95BF884F1AE27C030C56E95969C00200B22531DC2C794975D668F1DD0AEEDDD io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. mm.tkdt[.]cc Android/FakeWallet.X
2022‑02‑04 CC6E37F6C5AF1FF5193828DDC8F43DF0 452E2E3A77E1D8263D853C69440187E052EE3F0A A58B9C7763727C81D40F2B42CCCA0D34750CDF84FC20985699A6E28A4A85094F io.metamask Trojanized model of MetaMask Android utility. admin.metamaskio[.]vip Android/FakeWallet.Z
2022‑02‑07 68A68EFED8B70952A83AA5922EA334BD 4450F4ED0A5CF9D4F1CA6C98FC519891EF9D764F 3F82BA5AB3C3E9B9DDEAA7C33C670CE806A5E72D409C813FF7328434E2054E6D 6vugkf43gx.ipa Trojanized model of MetaMask iOS utility. admin.metamaskio[.]vip iOS/FakeWallet.A
2022‑02‑07 1EE43A8046FA9D68C78619E25CD37249 2B741593B58E64896004461733B7E86D98EB7B7D EB5EB7E345E4C48F86FB18ABC0883D61E956A24D5A9A4B488C2FDD91F789033A 00835616-3548-4fa4-8aee-828585de7680.ipa Trojanized model of MetaMask iOS utility. 725378[.]com iOS/FakeWallet.A
2022-02-01 9BFEE43D55DFD5A30861035DEED9F4B0 4165E9CDFC10FA118371CB77FE4AD4142C181B23 E1BF431DC0EBB670B743012638669A7CE3D42CE34F8F676B1512601CD8A6DBF0 Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. admin.token2[.]membership Android/FakeWallet.L
2022-02-01 D265C7894EDB20034E6E17B4FFE3EC5D 78644E1256D331957AA3BF0AC5A3D4D4F655C8EA 15C1532960AE3CAA8408C160755944BD3ABC12E8903D4D5130A364EF2274D758 Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. replace.imdt[.]cc Android/FakeWallet.M
2022-02-01 14AA1747C28FFC5CDB2D3D1F36587DF9 0DFD29CD560E0ACB6FCAF2407C504FEB95E3FC19 CB9757B7D76B9837CFC153A1BA9D1AC821D2DBDB09ED877082B0D041C22D66E9 Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. imbbq[.]co Android/FakeWallet.O
2022-01-05 3E008726C416963D0C5C78A1E71EBA65 16A0C8C24EF64F657696E176700A83B76FDA39C7 3069A2EED380D98AAE822A9B792927B498234C37E6813193B5881922992BAFEE Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. ds-super-admin.imtokens[.]cash Android/FakeWallet.Q
2022-02-01 CA3231E905C5308DE84D953377BB22C2 9D79392B1027C6E2AAD3B86C2E60141B8DF0879E 1D7D0D75319BFFF0C2E2E268F0054CAABD9F79783608292C2A6C61FABE079960 Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. appapi.imtoken[.]porn Android/FakeWallet.S
2021-12-13 C3B644531FC9640F45B22C76157350B6 AE22B21038787003E9B70BC162CCA12D5767EEBF 8E63CE669A7865B867C2D33CBCB69677E3CE51C3FBAB131171C8017E41F4EC5A Trojanized model of imToken Android utility. bh.imtoken[.]sx Android/FakeWallet.AI
2022‑02‑09 A62B00BF3F37EABB32D38AB4F999AB42 CA6DAF6645B2832AA5B0CC0FEAB41A848F7803D3 A6E6A4C80906D60CBEA4643AC97235B308F5EF35C5AB54B38BF63280F6A127D4 Trojanized model of imToken Android utility.[.]com Android/FakeWallet.AJ
2022-01-18 90B4C4CE9A0019ACB0EEDBA6392E8319 4A4C98D6E758536A20442A2FA9D81220FB73B56B 731F1952142CFFE3DBDD6CCD5221AEC6EC91679308F0A9D46B812B62EC861AEF org.toshi Trojanized model of Coinbase Pockets Android utility. 180.215.126[.]33:51148 Android/FakeWallet.C
2022-01-31 E27A4039D0A0FFD0C34E82B090EFE2BD 4C8DE212E49386E701DB212564389241CE4A7E5A 4736ECA0030C86D1AFA2C01558ED31151C3A72BA24D9ED278341AB3DF71467E5 org.toshi Trojanized model of Coinbase Pockets Android utility. token-lon[.]me Android/Spy.Agent.BYH
2022‑02‑07 6EFEF97F0633B3179C7DFC2D81FE67FB 0E419606D6174C36E53601DA5A10A7DBB3954A70 A092C7DD0E9DEF1C87FB8819CB91B4ECE26B140E60E5AD637768113733541C2B cce4492155695349d80ad508d33e33ae93772fba_3858264b86e27f12.ipa Trojanized model of Token Pocket iOS utility. jdzpfw[.]com iOS/FakeWallet.A
2022-01-19 149B8AADD097171CC85F45F4D913F194 51F038BC7CBB0D74459650B947927D916F598389 A427759DE6FE25E1B8894994A226C4517BB5C97CF893EC4B50CBD7A340F34152 com.cjaxx.libertywallet.alternate Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. ariodjs[.]xyz Android/FakeApp.OC
2022-01-12 3ED898EA1F47F67A80A7DD5CF0052417 022D9FBC989CA022FA48DF7A29F3778AFD009FFD BD626C5BD36E9206C48D0118B76D7F6F002FFCF2CF5F1B672D6D626EE09836BD com.jaxx_liberty.walletapp Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets corrupted pattern. Not included Android/FakeApp.NT
2022-01-19 D7B1263F7DA2FDA0FB81FBDAC511454C F938CEC631C8747AAE942546BB944905A35B5D7B 206123F2D992CD236E6DB1413BCFE4CE9D74721D509A0512CF70D62D466B690D com.jaxx_libertyfy_12.jaxxwalletpro Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. spspring.herokuapp[.]com Android/FakeApp.NT
2022-01-12 C3CBA07BEAF3F5326668A8E26D617E86 85ED0E51344E3435B3434B935D4FFCADAF06C631 1FE95756455FDDE54794C1DDDFB39968F1C9360E44BF6B8CE9CEF9A6BEDA4EE1 com.jaxxwebliberty.webviewapp Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. jaxx[.]tf Android/FakeApp.NV
2022-01-19 8F2B2272C06C4FE5D7962C7812E1AEA7 9D279FCA4747559435CCA2A680DB29E8BAC1C1F5 039544846724670DAE731389EB6E799E17B085DDD6D4670536803C5C3CEB7496 com.MBM.jaxxw Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. master-consultas[.]com/jaxliberty/ Android/FakeApp.OB
2022-01-19 99B4FF9C036EE771B62940AB8A987747 CE0380103B9890FD6B6F19C34D156B68E875F00C 8C8F65A70677C675EE2AF2C70DD439410DE3C3D0736FFC20D1AB7F1DA3F47956 com.VRA.jaxx Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. master-consultas[.]com/jaxliberty/ Android/FakeApp.NZ
2022-01-12 9D9D85400771684BE53012B828832F31 45DA3F337ABA9454323DF9B1F765E7F8439BFFD8 58106983A575DF14291AC501221E5F7CCD6CE2239CBFEC089A7596EEBE3DFA9C Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. Telegram chat_id: 959983483 Android/FakeApp.NS
2022-01-19 271550A137B28DB5AF457E3E48F2AAB0 5605426A09E0DD285C86DB0DE335E7942A765C8E F87CC7B548A3AD8D694E963013D2D0370FE6D37FC2024FBE624844489B4C428D io.jaxxc.ertyx Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. czbsugjk[.]xyz Android/FakeApp.OE
2022-01-19 28DB921C6CFD4EAD93DF810B7F514AEE 3B6E2966D3EF676B453C3A5279FFF927FA385185 19F0F9BF72C071959395633A2C0C6EB54E31B6C4521311C333FA292D9E0B0F1D io.jaxxc.ertyxcc Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. czbsugjk[.]xyz Android/FakeApp.OF
2022-01-19 F06603B2B589D7F82D107AB8B566D889 568546D9B5D4EA2FBDE53C95A76B26E8655D5BC5 CAAD41986C5D74F8F923D258D82796632D069C5569503BFB16E7B036945F5290 jax.wall.alternate.bnc Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. jaxxwalletinc[.]dwell Android/FakeApp.OA
2022-01-19 F4BEACADF06B09FD4367F17D3A0D8E22 97E13DBD320EE09B5934A3B4D5A7FF23BA11E81C A99AA5412EA12CB7C2C1E21C1896F38108D7F6E24C9FDD7D04498592CF804369 Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. jabirs-xso-xxx-wallet[.]com Android/FakeApp.OD
2022-01-12 295E7E67B025269898E462A92B597111 75F447226C8322AE55D93E4BCF23723C2EAB30E3 2816B84774235DFE2FBFCC2AF5B2A9BE3AB3A218FA1C58A8A21E7973E640EB85 Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. jaxx.podzone[.]org Android/FakeApp.NW
2022-01-12 6D9CF48DD899C90BA7D495DDF7A04C88 3C1EF2ED77DB8EFA46C50D781EF2283567AFC96F DB9E9CF514E9F4F6B50937F49863379E23FE55B430FFB0DB068AE8ED2CA0EEE8 pockets.cryptojx.retailer Pretend Jaxx Liberty pockets. saaditrezxie[.]retailer Android/FakeApp.NU


IP Supplier First seen Particulars
185.244.150[.]159 Dynadot 2022-01-20 19:36:29 token2[.]membership Distribution web site
3.33.236[.]231 GoDaddy 2022-01-27 16:55:51 imtoken[.]porn Distribution web site
172.67.210[.]44 广州云 讯 信息科技有限公司 2022-01-24 12:53:46 imtken[.]cn Distribution web site
172.67.207[.]186 GoDaddy 2021-12-01 17:57:00 im-token[.]one Distribution web site
47.243.75[.]229 GoDaddy 2021-12-09 11:22:03 imtokenep[.]com Distribution web site
154.82.111[.]186 GoDaddy 2022-01-24 11:43:46 imttoken[.]org Distribution web site
104.21.89[.]154 GoDaddy 2022-01-24 11:26:23 imtokens[.]cash Distribution web site
104.21.23[.]48 N/A 2022-01-06 12:24:28 mtokens[.]im Distribution web site
162.0.209[.]104 Namecheap 2020-10-02 11:14:06 tokenweb[.]on-line Distribution web site
156.226.173[.]11 GoDaddy 2022-01-27 17:04:42 metamask-wallet[.]xyz Distribution web site
103.122.95[.]35 GoDaddy 2022-01-24 11:04:56 metemas[.]me Distribution web site
104.21.34[.]145 GoDaddy 2021-11-12 20:41:32 metamasks[.]me Distribution web site
8.212.40[.]178 TopNets Expertise 2021-05-31 08:29:39 metamask[.]hk Distribution web site
45.116.163[.]65 Xin Web Expertise 2021-10-18 16:24:49 metamaskey[.]com Distribution web site
172.67.180[.]104 NameSilo 2021-10-01 13:26:26 2022mask[.]com Distribution web site
69.160.170[.]165 Hefei Juming Community Expertise 2022-01-13 12:25:38 metamadk[.]com Distribution web site
104.21.36[.]169 NameSilo 2021-11-28 03:54:13 metemasks[.]dwell Distribution web site
45.116.163[.]65 阿里云 计 算有限公司(万网) 2021-12-10 15:39:07[.]cn Distribution web site
45.116.163[.]65 Xin Web Expertise 2021-11-06 13:25:43 tokenp0cket[.]com Distribution web site
104.21.24[.]64 NameSilo 2021-11-14 07:29:44 im-tokens[.]information Distribution web site
104.21.70[.]114 NameSilo 2021-12-30 13:39:22 tokenpockets[.]buzz Distribution web site
172.67.201[.]47 NameSilo 2022-02-06 03:47:17 bitepie[.]membership Distribution web site
104.21.30[.]224 NameSilo 2021-11-22 08:20:59 onekeys[.]dev Distribution web site
206.119.82[.]147 Gname 2021-12-23 21:41:40 metamaskio[.]vip Distribution web site
45.116.163[.]65 Xin Web Expertise 2021-12-10 15:33:41 zh-imtoken[.]com Distribution web site
47.243.117[.]119 广州云 讯 信息科技有限公司 2021-10-18 11:36:07[.]cn Distribution web site
104.21.20[.]159 NameSilo 2021-11-19 16:39:52 lmtokenn[.]cc Distribution web site
104.21.61[.]17 NameSilo 2021-12-30 12:33:04 lntokems[.]membership Distribution web site
104.21.26[.]245 NameSilo 2021-11-26 18:39:27 matemasks[.]date Distribution web site
172.67.159[.]121 NameSilo 2022-02-06 03:48:54 bitpio[.]com Distribution web site
172.67.171[.]168 NameSilo 2022-02-06 03:50:25 onekeys[.]mobi Distribution web site
172.67.133[.]7 NameSilo 2021-12-28 06:57:00 tokenpockets[.]org Distribution web site
216.83.46[.]49 Dynadot 2022-01-17 17:22:40 app-coinbase[.]co Distribution web site
172.67.182[.]118 Gandi SAS 2022-02-13 00:46:46 imtoken[.]sx Distribution web site
104.21.34[.]81 N/A 2022-01-20 18:24:30 imtoken.internet[.]im Distribution web site
104.21.87[.]75 Nets To 2022-02-09 09:09:38[.]com Distribution web site
104.21.11[.]70 NETMASTER SARL 2022-02-09 09:08:05 imtoken[.]tg Distribution web site NameSilo 2022-02-06 03:52:06 replace.imdt[.]cc C&C
97.74.83[.]237 GoDaddy 2022-01-27 18:44:33 imbbq[.]co C&C
172.67.189[.]148 GoDaddy 2022-01-27 16:07:53 ds-super-admin.imtokens[.]cash C&C
156.226.173[.]11 GoDaddy 2022-01-19 14:59:48 imtokenss.token-app[.]cc C&C
45.154.213[.]11 Alibaba Cloud Computing 2021-12-31 21:48:56 xdhbj[.]com C&C
47.242.200[.]140 Alibaba Cloud Computing 2021-05-28 11:42:54 replace.xzxqsf[.]com C&C
45.155.43[.]118 NameSilo 2021-09-24 10:03:29 metamask.tptokenm[.]dwell C&C
172.67.223[.]58 GoDaddy 2022-01-19 22:51:08 two.shayu[.]la C&C
45.154.213[.]18 Xin Web Expertise 2018-08-03 23:00:00 jdzpfw[.]com C&C
104.21.86[.]197 NameSilo 2022-02-06 03:48:48 bp.tkdt[.]cc C&C
104.21.86[.]197 NameSilo 2022-02-06 04:04:29 okay.tkdt[.]cc C&C
172.67.136[.]90 NameSilo 2022-02-03 02:00:42 mm.tkdt[.]cc C&C
8.210.235[.]71 Dynadot 2021-07-16 13:25:06 token-lon[.]me C&C
172.67.182[.]118 Gandi SAS 2022-02-13 00:51:18 bh.imtoken[.]sx C&C
172.67.142[.]90 Nets To 2022-02-09 09:18:54[.]com C&C 2022-02-13 00:59:59 api.tipi21341[.]com C&C
89.223.124[.]75 Namecheap 2022-01-18 11:34:56 ariodjs[.]xyz C&C
199.36.158[.]100 MarkMonitor 2022-02-03 02:22:17[.]app C&C
195.161.62[.]125 REGRU-SU 2019-08-04 23:00:00 jaxx[.]su C&C
111.90.156[.]9 REGRU-SU 2021-09-29 03:12:49 jaxx[.]tf C&C
111.90.145[.]75 Internet hosting Ideas B.V. d/b/a 2018-09-11 23:00:00 master-consultas[.]com C&C
104.219.248[.]112 Namecheap 2022-01-19 23:03:52 jaxxwalletinc[.]dwell C&C
50.87.228[.]40 FastDomain 2021-09-09 21:15:10 jabirs-xso-xxx-wallet[.]com C&C
88.80.187[.]8 Tucows Domains 2022-01-06 03:52:05 jaxx.podzone[.]org C&C
192.64.118[.]16 Namecheap 2022-01-07 16:09:06 saaditrezxie[.]retailer C&C

MITRE ATT&CK strategies

Be aware: This desk was constructed utilizing version 10 of the ATT&CK framework.

Tactic ID Identify Description
Preliminary Entry T1444 Masquerade as Professional Utility Pretend web site supplies trojanized Android and/or iOS apps for obtain.
T1478 Set up Insecure or Malicious Configuration Pretend web site supplies a obtain of a malicious configuration profile for iOS.
T1475 Ship Malicious App by way of Approved App Retailer Pretend cryptocurrency pockets apps had been distributed by way of Google Play.
Credential Entry T1417 Enter Seize Trojanized pockets apps intercept seed phrases throughout preliminary pockets creation. Pretend Jaxx apps request seed phrase below the guise of connecting to the sufferer’s Jaxx account.
Exfiltration T1437 Normal Utility Layer Protocol Malicious code exfiltrates restoration seed phrase over normal HTTP or HTTPS protocols.

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