BladeHawk group: Android espionage against Kurdish ethnic group

ESET researchers have investigated a focused cell espionage marketing campaign in opposition to the Kurdish ethnic group. This marketing campaign has been lively since at the very least March 2020, distributing (through devoted Fb profiles) two Android backdoors generally known as 888 RAT and SpyNote, disguised as legit apps. These profiles gave the impression to be offering Android information in Kurdish, and information for the Kurds’ supporters. Among the profiles intentionally unfold extra spying apps to Fb public teams with pro-Kurd content material. Knowledge from a obtain website signifies at the very least 1,481 downloads from URLs promoted in just some Fb posts.

The newly found Android 888 RAT has been utilized by the Kasablanka group and by BladeHawk. Each of them used various names to discuss with the identical Android RAT – LodaRAT and Gaza007 respectively.

BladeHawk Android espionage

The espionage exercise reported right here is straight related to 2 publicly disclosed instances printed in 2020. QiAnXin Risk Intelligence Middle named the group behind these assaults BladeHawk, which we’ve adopted. Each campaigns have been distributed through Fb, utilizing malware that was constructed with industrial, automated instruments (888 RAT and SpyNote), with all samples of the malware utilizing the identical C&C servers.

Distribution

Determine 1. One of many Fb posts

In a single case, we noticed an try (Determine 2) to seize Snapchat credentials through a phishing web site (Determine 3).

Determine 2. Fb publish resulting in a Snapchat phishing website

Determine 3. Snapchat phishing web site

We recognized 28 distinctive posts as a part of this BladeHawk marketing campaign. Every of those posts contained faux app descriptions and hyperlinks to obtain an app, and we have been capable of obtain 17 distinctive APKs from these hyperlinks. Among the APK internet hyperlinks pointed on to the malicious app, whereas others pointed to the third-party add service top4top.io, which tracks the variety of file downloads (see Determine 4). Due to that, we obtained the whole variety of downloads from top4top.io for these eight apps. These eight apps have been downloaded altogether 1,481 occasions, from July 20, 2020 till June 28, 2021.

Determine 4. Details about one RAT pattern hosted on a third-party service

Samples

To our information, this marketing campaign focused solely Android customers, with the risk actors centered on two industrial Android RAT instruments – 888 RAT and SpyNote. We discovered just one pattern of the latter throughout our analysis. Because it was constructed utilizing an outdated, already analyzed SpyNote builder, right here we embrace solely the evaluation of the 888 RAT samples.

Android 888 RAT

Determine 5. Worth for 888 RAT

In 2019 the Professional model (Home windows and Android) was discovered cracked (see Determine 6) and obtainable on just a few web sites free of charge.

Determine 6. Cracked model of 888 RAT builder

888 RAT has not been straight recognized with any organized campaigns earlier than; that is the primary time this RAT has been assigned as an indicator of a cyberespionage group.

Following this discovery, we have been capable of join the Android 888 RAT to 2 extra organized campaigns: Spy TikTok Professional described here and a marketing campaign by Kasablanka Group.

Performance

Android 888 RAT is able to executing 42 instructions acquired from its C&C server, as seen in Desk 1.

Briefly, it could actually steal and delete information from a tool, take screenshots, get system location, phish Fb credentials, get an inventory of put in apps, steal consumer photographs, take photographs, file surrounding audio and telephone calls, make calls, steal SMS messages, steal the system’s contact checklist, ship textual content messages, and so forth.

The builder can also be used because the C&C to manage all of the compromised units because it makes use of dynamic DNS to be reached by them.

Desk 1. Record of supported instructions

An essential issue when figuring out 888 RAT is the bundle identify of the payload. The bundle identify of each construct of an Android payload is just not customized or random; it at all times makes use of the com.instance.dat.a8andoserverx bundle ID. Due to this, it’s straightforward to determine such samples as 888 RAT.

In later variations of the 888 RAT (not the cracked RAT builder), we observed that the builder was able to obfuscating strings (command strings, C&C, and different plain textual content strings) by encrypting them utilizing AES with a hardcoded key; nevertheless, the bundle identify nonetheless remained the identical.

C&C

888 RAT makes use of a customized IP protocol and port (it doesn’t must be normal ports). Compromised units are managed straight from the builder GUI.

Fb phishing

When this performance is triggered, 888 RAT will deploy phishing exercise that seems to be coming from the legit Fb app. When the consumer faucets on the current apps button, this exercise will appear legit, as seen in Determine 7. Nevertheless, after a protracted press on this app’s icon, as in Determine 8, the true app identify answerable for the Fb login request is disclosed.

Determine 7. Phishing request seen from the current app menu

Determine 8. Actual utility identify answerable for phishing

Detection

Since 2018, ESET merchandise have recognized a whole bunch of situations of Android units the place the 888 RAT was deployed. Determine 9 presents the nation distribution of this detection information.

Determine 9. Detection of Android 888 RAT by nation

Conclusion

Fb profiles

Fb teams

Distribution hyperlinks

Phishing hyperlinks

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk solely covers TTPs for 888 RAT, and was constructed utilizing version 9 of the ATT&CK framework.